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CONTROL OF CORPORATE AND UNION POLITICAL EXPENDI-
TURES: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The post Civil War industrial expansion stimulated the growth of large cor-
porations and produced perhaps an undue concentration of wealth and power
in such corporations. Toward the close of the 19th century there came a
public reaction to the economic and political abuses which were consequent
upon this corporate concentration of wealth.1 Reforms took shape not only
in income tax laws and in anti-trust legislation. Congress also recognized that
in the concentration of wealth there lay a danger to our system of free and
untrammeled federal elections. The impersonal legal entity organized pri-
marily for non-political purposes was, when possessed of substantial wealth,
found capable of exercising a disproportionate influence upon both the elec-
torate and their representatives. The legislative restrictions upon the exercise
of that potential influence have evolved over half a century, and currently
operate to impose criminal liability upon corporations and labor organizations
for making any "contribution or expenditure in connection with any [federal]
election."2 Such legislation poses several constitutional issues.
The question of the effect of the legislation upon the privilege of free speech
under the first amendment arises from the fact that legal entities, being arti-
ficial persons, cannot act or communicate personally and always require the
intervention of some medium of expression which of necessity involves some
contribution or expenditure. It follows that a restriction upon such expend-
itures and contributions involves a restriction upon the speech of the corpora-
tion. Specifically, what is involved in a statute enacting such a restriction is
the basic question of the power of the Congress to legislate in the field. May
Congress, in effect, make a particular type of speech, that of legal entities in
connection with federal elections, a crime? In turn, that question involves the
issue of the constitutional status of a legal entity in so far as a claim of first
amendment rights is concerned. Is an artificial person entitled to the first
amendment's guarantee of free speech? Assuming both that Congress has the
power to enact such legislation, and that a corporation or other legal entity
has the status to challenge its constitutionality, the question next arising is
whether the statute represents the achievement of a proper balance between
the desirability of maintaining the integrity of first amendment rights on the
one hand, and, on the other, the necessity of obviating evils or abuses which
militate against the foundation upon which those rights are secured. Is the
abridgment of free speech effected by this statute a reasonable limitation upon
that first amendment privilege?
Assuming that the legislation is valid in respect to the first amendment, it
is a penal statute and must meet the requirements of fifth amendment due
process. Does the statute sufficiently define those acts which constitute the
crime, i.e., does it give "fair warning"?
The Supreme Court has never squarely passed on the constitutionality of this
statute, but has gratuitously expressed its grave doubts, and in both con-
1. See United States v. International Union, UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 569 (1957).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
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curring 3 and dissenting4 opinions the validity of such a restraint upon the first
amendment rights has been flatly rejected.
THE STATUTE
In applicable part, section 610 of title 18 provides that
It is unlawful for any ... corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make
a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential
and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any
primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any
of the foregoing offices ...
Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution or ex-
penditure in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $5000; and every
officer or director of any corporation, or officer of any labor organization, who con-
sents to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation or labor organization, as
the case may be... shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and if the violation was willful, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.5
That Congress has the right to legislate respecting the conduct of federal
elections is obvious. The Constitution entrusts to the state legislatures the
right to prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives," but reserves to Congress the paramount power
to "anytime by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
choosing Senators." 6 That power, however, is not limited merely to regulating
the taking of the vote, 7 but extends to the enactment of such rules and regula-
tions surrounding the entire electoral process as the Congress considers necessary
and advisable to insure the purity and freedom of federal elections. 8 In par-
ticular, it has been held a valid exercise of that power to adopt measures cal-
culated to protect the electoral process from the potential undue influence
which great wealth holds.9 "To say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . a federal election from the improper
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular
the power of self-protection."' 0 The statute with which we are here concerned
is but another exercise of that power of self-protection. Its genesis and develop-
3. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
4. United States v. International Union, UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (dis-
senting opinion).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.
7. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ex
parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
8. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941); Burroughs & Cannon v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1934); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932); United
States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 482 (1917) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 100 U.S. 651, 666-67
(1884).
9. Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
10. Id. at 545.
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ment clearly reveal that its purpose also was the safeguarding of federal elec-
tions from the improper influence of money.
The 1907 Act
The proscription of contributions for the purpose of influencing the outcome
of federal elections was first enacted in 1907.11 In substance, the 1907 act
declared it unlawful for a corporation organized under authority of any federal
statute to make a money contribution in connection with federal, state, or local
elections, and declared it unlawful for any corporation, regardless of the au-
thority under which organized, to make a money contribution in connection
with any federal election. The hearings and debate6 preceding enactment of
the 1907 act reflect that the primary factor motivating its enactment was a
grave concern on the part of Congress over the strong influence brought to bear
on elections by corporations. Complaint that corporate contributions exercised
great influence is recorded as early as 1892, and it was estimated that a sum
in excess of 16 million dollars was spent in the presidential campaign of 1896.12
The attitude of Congress toward this legislation was clear:
The idea is to prevent . . . the great railroad companies, the great insurance com-
panies, the great telephone companies, the great aggregations of wealth from using
their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the legislature to
these halls in order to vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests
as against those of the public.... The time has come when something ought to be
done to put a check to the giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by a great corporation
toward political purpose upon the understanding that a debt is created from a
political party to it.13
The 1909 Act
When the federal penal law was codified in 1909, the 1907 statute was re-
pealed and re-enacted without change. 14 The debates on the bill demonstrate
the continuing concern of Congress over the undue influence of corporations
over elections. 15 Consideration was even given to extending the proscription of
political contributions by corporations to elections of state legislatures, since,
at that time, United States Senators were elected by state legislatures. It was
further suggested that the prohibition of "money" contributions by corpora-
tions was inadequate, and that the prohibition should be extended to contribu-
tions of "anything of value."' 6 However, because of doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of the proposal to extend the proscription to elections of state legis-
latures, and because the bill before the Congress was only a bill for codification
of all the penal laws, no changes were effected.
11. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864.
12. Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Election of the President, March 12,
1906, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1906).
13. Id. at 12.
14. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 83, 35 Stat. 1103.
15. 42 Cong. Rec. 695-703 (1908).
16. "It was the intention of Congress to prohibit corporations . . . from contributing
their assets to political contests. But under the section as it now stands it simply prohibits
the contribution of money .... lilt ought to be extended so as to include the contribution
of any other thing of value .... " Id. at 696.
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The 1925 Act
In 1921, the Supreme Court, in Newberry v. United States,17 held federal
corrupt practices legislation, as applied to primary elections of candidates for
the Senate, unconstitutional. The Court held that elections within the original
intendment of section 4 of Article I of the Constitution were those wherein
Senators should be chosen by state legislatures. The seventeenth amendment,
providing for election of Senators by the people, did not modify the congres-
sional power under the same section to regulate the times, pfaces and manner
of holding elections. Newberry, although it has subsequently been impliedly
overruled by silence and distinctions,i 8 at the time was generally considered to
have invalidated all of the federal corrupt practices legislation relating to nom-
inations. Accordingly, a number of bills were introduced in the House and
Senate for the purpose of completely revising the federal corrupt practices
legislation in the light of that decision. The proposed legislation was enacted
as the popularly entitled Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.19
In this act the proscription against corporate contributions for political pur-
poses was re-enacted as section 313 thereof. The significant amendments were
as follows: (a) The phrase "money contribution" appearing in the 1907 and
1909 acts was changed to "contribution" and "contribution" was nonexclusively
defined as, "a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or
anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or
not legally enforceable, to make a contribution.1 20  (b) The prohibition of
corporate contributions in connection with "any election by any State legis-
lature of a United States Senator" was changed to "any election at which...
a Senator ... is to be voted for . . ." to conform to the change in the manner
of senatorial elections. The proscription was also extended to elections of
Delegates and Resident Commissioners to Congress. (c) A provision was
added making it unlawful "for any candidate, political committee, or other
person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section." 21
(d) Primaries and conventions were excluded from the scope of the act to
conform to the Newberry decision. 22
The debates preceding the 1925 Act again emphasized the concern felt in
respect to the influence exerted on elections by large aggregations of money:
One of the great political evils of the time is the apparent hold on political parties
which business interest and certain organizations seek and sometimes obtain by
reason of liberal campaign contributions. Many believe that when an individual or
association of individuals makes large contributions for the purpose of aiding can-
didates of political parties in winning the elections, they expect, and sometimes
demand, and occasionally, at least, receive consideration by the beneficiaries of their
contributions which not infrequently is harmful to the general public interest. It is
17. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
18. See note 25 infra.
19. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070.
20. Id. § 302(d), 43 Stat. 1071.
21. Id. § 312, 43 Stat. 1073.
22. Id. § 302(a), 43 Stat. 1070. See H.R. Rep. No. 721 to accompany H.R. 8956, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924).
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unquestionably an evil which ought to be dealt with, and dealt with intelligently and
effectively.23
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
Section 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 194724 amended
section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act in three significant aspects:
(a) The proscription against political "contributions" was extended to "ex-
penditures." (b) Whereas the provision formerly applied only to elections, the
law as amended was applied also to primaries, conventions and caucuses held
to select candidates for federal office.25 (c) The application of the provision to
labor organizations, which under the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 had
been temporary, was made permanent.
The extension of the statute to "expenditures" is not mere verbiage. It was
the result of a careful analysis by a house committee appointed to study eva-
sion of the statute. The committee reported:
It has been the contention of union groups that money expended by them for or
against a political candidate or party and not given directly to candidates or political
parties, is not a contribution as defined in the law but is an expenditure not restricted
by law.
If such a distinction stands, then national banks, corporations, and groups, as well
as labor organizations, might avail themselves of this avenue to avoid the provisions
of the existing law.
20
The following year a similar committee investigating the expenditures of
union political committees and organizations asserted:
The intent and purpose of the provision of the act prohibting any corporation or
labor organization making any contribution in connection with any election would
be wholly defeated if it were assumed that the term "making any contribution" re-
lated only to the donating of money directly to a candidate, and excluded the vast
expenditures of money in the activities herein shown to be engaged in extensively.
Of what avail would a law be to prohibit the contributing directly to a candidate and
yet permit the expenditure of large sums in his behalf?
The committee is firmly convinced, after a thorough study of the provisions of the
act, the legislative history of the same, and the debates on the said provisions when
it was pending before the House that the act was intended to prohibit such ex-
penditures.27
23. 65 Cong. Rec. 9507-08 (1924).
24. 61 Stat. 159 (1947), 2 U.S.C. § 251 (1952).
25. It can be said therefore, that although never expressly overruled, the decision in
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), "rests on so insecure a basis as to make
its reversal highly probable if the issue should again come before the Court." Rottschaefer,
Constitutional Law, 154-55 (1939). It might be said, in view of the later decision in
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930), which upheld a federal statute pro-
hibiting candidates for Congress from soliciting funds from federal officeholders to finance
his activity in a primary contest, that the Newberry case has indeed already been ignored.
26. House Special Comm. to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, H.R. Rep. No. 2093,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1945).
27. House Special Comm. to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, H.R. Rep. No. 2739,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1947).
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The Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures of
1946 also considered these problems, and in 1947 recommended that primaries
and conventions be included, that "contribution" and "expenditure" be re-
defined, and that "expenditures" as well as "contributions" be included in the
ban.2 8  The paramount reason for extending the prohibition to include ex-
penditures arose out of the not uncommon situation in which corporate stock-
holders who did not share the political views of the board of directors were
required to contribute to the support of a party, candidate or proposition which
the corporation chose, but to which the members were opposed.2 9 It was em-
phasized in the debates that the proscription against contributions and ex-
penditures by corporations and labor organizations as well, would apply only
to corporate or union funds, and was not intended to apply to voluntary con-
tributions by stockholders or union members for a political purpose. The
debates also made it clear that such business associations as the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce, even
if not corporations themselves, were prohibited by the act from expending
money for political purposes if the funds were contributed to them by cor-
porations.30
It would appear clear, therefore, that the steps taken by the Congress to
curb abuses of the electoral process were legitimate and thoroughly considered
exercises of its constitutional power and responsibility. The specific measures
adopted were designed to meet particular abuses of which Congress was aware,
and with the correction of which it was properly concerned. Not unmindful
of their further duty to respect the rights granted by the first amendment, the
members debated the validity of such a restriction on the right of free speech,
and, assured of the necessity and consequent reasonableness of the measure,
adopted it by a clear majority.
THE FmRST AMENDMENT PROBLEM
Preliminary to any evaluation of the restriction which section 610 imposes
upon the free exercise of the right to speak, it must be questioned whether
the scope of the first amendment rights applies with equal force to both
natural and artificial persons.31 It has been held that the provision of the fifth
amendment that "no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law," so far as it concerns property rights, applies
equally to private corporations and natural persons,32 but the provision against
self-incrimination in the same amendment does not.33 Likewise, a corporation
has been held to be a person within both the equal protection clause and the
28. S. Rep. No. 1, Part 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-39 (1947).
29. 93 Cong. Rec. 6437 (1947).
30. 93 Cong. Rec. 6439 (1947).
31. See analyses of cases at 20 Ann. Cas. 737 (1911), 31 Ann. Cas. 1305 (1914A), 7
Ann. Cas. 1104 (1907).
32. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); San Mateo
County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
33. In re Bornn Hat Co., 184 Fed. 506 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 223 U.S. 713 (1912).
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due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 4 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has never squarely passed on the application of the first amendment to
corporations.
A New Jersey court flatly rejected the contention of applicability, holding
that "the rights . . [under the state constitution equivalent to the first
amendment] run only to natural persons . . . and the corporation itself has
no constitutional right to conduct a meeting, or, by its agents, to speak. '35
The approach suggested by dicta in Supreme Court cases, being more liberal,
would not wholly except business or economic activity from application of
first amendment rights and privileges,38 especially where corporate- property,
which in reality is that of its members,3 will be protected by their invocation.3 8
Moreover, the Court in Grosjean v. American Press Co. 39 held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment channelled the first amendment
guarantee of a free press so as to bar an unreasonable control by the states. If
the Court holds that an artificial person is protected under the first amend-
ment guarantee of a free press, why should it not hold that such a person is
protected under the first amendment guarantee of free speech? 40  It is true
that freedom of the press, because of its nature, is one which a corporation
must be deemed to possess if the privilege is to have any practical meaning
and this is not necessarily so in respect of freedom of speech. Nevertheless,
as has been noted, the Court has recognized that there may be instances in
which a corporation should have the right to speak. The complexities of
modern corporate organization are such that on many issues respecting the
interests of its members only the corporation as such is really qualified to
speak. Rather than attempt to qualify the specific instances in which the cor-
poration should have the right to speak, it seems sounder to hold that a cor-
poration has the right to free speech under the first amendment subject to the
reasonable limitations generally applicable to such rights.
34. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
35. American League of the Friends of New Germany v. Eastmead, 116 NJ.Eq. 487,
174 At. 156 (1934).
36. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
37. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
38. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
39. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
40. The Court in Grosjean noted, "freedom of speech and of the press are rights
of the same fundamental character, safeguarded by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment .... " 297 U.S. at 244. It is settled law that both of these rights are protected
against state and federal abridgment in regard to their exercise by natural persons. This
is not to say, of course, that an artificial person has the constitutional right to free speech
but the language of the Court certainly would favor such a conclusion. If the rights are
of the same "fundamental character" and Grosjean held that a corporation has the right
of free press, would not the Court be inclined to say that corporations also have the right
of free speech. It would be clear that if due process of the fourteenth amendment in respect
to corporations included the right of free speech, due process of the fifth amendment would
require no less. But on the federal level there would be no need to establish such a right
under the concept of due process since the first amendment already provides for it.
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Although there "are divergent views which the Supreme Court may have to
resolve at some future date,"41 the recorded attitude of the Court appears to
presage first amendment protection of "the expression of bloc sentiment,"'a
and adoption of the concept that "first amendment rights are part of the
heritage of all persons and groups in this country . . . not to be dispensed or
withheld merely because the Court or the Congress thinks the person or group
is worthy or unworthy. '43 Assuming for our purposes that a legal entity,
whether a corporation or unit of organized labor, is competent to contest the
reasonableness of the restraint effected by section 610, broader issues emerge.
Achieving a Balance
Although the basis of the first amendment is the hypothesis that free debate
of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies,4 4 the rights included
within its grant are not absolute or unlimited. Where necessary for the public
welfare, they must on occasion be held subordinate.4 5 "Legislation restricting
freedom of speech has been sustained whenever the acts prohibited have been
clearly injurious to the safety of the nation or state, or have been done with
the intention of bringing about those substantive evils which the nation ... or
state has a right to prevent."4 6 Most clearly, restrictions abridging freedom
of political speech concerning matters of internal security have repeatedly been
successfully defended as reasonable protective measures designed to cope with
particular substantive evils.4 7 There is no doubt, as the legislative history of
section 610 makes abundantly clear, that corporations in the past have wielded
their power to corrupt elections. The realist must accept the same potential
influence in organized labor as in organized capital. Predicating the existence
of such a substantive evil, and the exercise by the Congress of its power to
combat it, the factors then to be considered in determining whether the legis-
lature has exceeded its constitutional bounds are the nature of the right pro-
tected, the extent of the abridgment, and the seriousness and imminence of the
danger to the right which is protected.4 8
Section 610 would not appear an unreasonable choice. Its interdictions are
aimed at nothing but entities which, as such, have no vote. No individual
member thereof is affected by the statute-personal rights remain intact and
unabridged. In view of the fact that contributions and expenditures volun-
tarily assented to by the members are not prohibited, and since nothing in the
statute bars corporate stockholders or union members from combining together
and expressing a joint viewpoint, the statute would appear to have been as
41. Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 61 (1958).
42. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948).
43. United States v. International Union, UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 576, 597 (1957).
44. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951).
45. See Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939).
46. Id. at 758.
47. United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); cf. United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612 (1954).
48. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
261-63 (1941).
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"narrowly drawn" 49 as is required. A claim of unreasonableness must answer
the argument of history, since this section and similar state statutes ° have thus
far survived the test of years. In one lower court decision, United States v.
United States Brewers Ass'n,51 in which the issue of constitutionality was
directly raised, the statute was upheld. The court there considered an indict-
ment of the defendant corporation for making a money contribution in con-
nection with a congressional election. The issue was whether the statute un-
reasonably restricted first amendment rights in that it attempted to prohibit
freedom of speech and freedom of press in the discussion of candidates and
of political questions involved in such elections.
The court held, "The section itself neither prevents, nor purports to pro-
hibit, the freedom of speech or of the press. Its purpose is to guard elections
from corruption, and the electorate from corrupting influence in arriving at
their choice."152 The court reasoned that any law, the purpose of which is to
enable a free and intelligent choice and an untrammeled expression of that
choice, "is a regulation of the manner of holding the election. . . ,,"5 The
court did not feel that the statute involved abridgment of first amendment
free speech. It should be noted, however, that the statute as it was before this
court prohibited only corporate contributions in connection with federal elec-
tions. The present statute prohibits both contributions and expenditures. It
may be plausible to argue that a corporation need not contribute to campaigns
in order to exercise its power of speech and, therefore, a statute prohibiting
contributions does not limit speech. As a practical matter, however, a cor-
poration cannot speak without making expenditures of some kind, thus the
present statute certainly involves the first amendment problem. As the court
noted, the benefit of any doubt as to constitutionality lies with the statute.54
It is submitted that Congress in the present statute has, in fact, struck a rea-
sonable balance between its duty to protect the electoral process and its duty
to recognize the first amendment privilege of free speech. If this be so, then
the conclusion of Brewers Ass'n as to constitutionality would seem valid in
respect to the statute as it presently exists.
Similarly, statutes prohibiting government employees or members of Congress
from soliciting or receiving money from federal employees have been held not
to be an unreasonable infringement upon the constitutional rights of such
workers.55  As the Supreme Court noted recently in United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell,5" the argument that a statute prohibiting political contributions by
49. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
50. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 816-a (Supp. 1955); Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 24, §§ 19-35
(Smith-Hurd); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 55 § 7 (1953); N.Y. Pen. L. § 671 (1); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 25, § 3226 (Supp. 1957).
51. 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
52. Id. at 169.
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at 170.
55. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371,
373 (1882).
56. 330 U. S. 75, 98 (1947).
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federal employees to members of Congress constituted an unreasonable in-
fringement upon the political rights of a citizen was, by the time of United
States v. Wurzbach,57 dismissed in a sentence. Thus, in substance, the Court
has held that the right to give money to a political candidate is not an absolute
constitutional right.
Congress was acutely aware of the necessity of balancing the guarantees of
the first amendment against its duty to keep the electoral process free from
corruption. The probable impairment of those rights was anticipated, con-
sidered and debated. Yet, by an overwhelming majority, the prohibition was
enacted. In the judgment of the legislature the danger to free elections was
sufficiently great to warrant and justify any incidental impairment of first
amendment rights which might result therefrom. 5
8
Judged in relation to the power of Congress to maintain free elections for
federal office, the ban on expenditures is as reasonable as the ban on contribu-
tions. If the contribution by a corporation of funds in support of a candidate
is a danger to free elections which Congress has the right to control, the ex-
penditure of funds by the same entity for the same purpose should also be a
matter which Congress has a right to control.
Corporations and labor organizations cannot speak personally. The inter-
vention of a medium is always a condition to communication; and media in-
volve a necessary expenditure. In this respect, an analogy may be drawn
between electioneering by a legal entity, and picketing by a labor organiza-
tion.59 The exercise of free speech by either necessarily involves two elements:
an idea and a medium. In the former the medium may take various forms, all
reducible to characterization as an expenditure of funds; in the latter the me-
dium is the common trade practice, the act of picketing. Although precedent
may be found for considering picketing as a constitutional right,60 being con-
sidered only a form of free speech, later cases have qualified the rule. 61 Picket-
ing is a trade practice which may or may not contravene federal or state statutes,
depending upon the excesses to which it is carried. Statutory restrictions on
picketing, although resulting in a necessary limitation of the right to free
speech which is being thereby exercised, have been held valid. Such a result
obtains when the act of picketing constitutes in effect an unlawful combination
to restrain trade.62 In much the same fashion, section 610 prohibits resort to
that element without which free political speech cannot be exercised at elec-
tion time; and if the reasonableness and propriety of the prohibition be estab-
lished, the restriction must likewise be upheld.63
57. 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
58. 65 Cong. Rec. 9507-65 (1924).
59. Cf. Ruark, supra note 41.
60. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
61. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
62. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra note 61.
63. In this respect, expenditures, like "picketing, not being the equivalent of speech as
a matter of fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent." Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S.
460, 465 (1950). Further, it is "to deal in pernicious abstraction 'to compare .. .picketing
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Although the language of the Court in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell0 4
could be construed to except the exercise of congressional power over elections
from the popularly known "clear and present danger" 65 test the statute should
not be found lacking even if the test be applied. 68 That test requires that the
prohibited act be such as would cause as a necessary result a substantive evil,
and that the probability of that substantive evil resulting be both clear and
imminently expected. There are not involved here, however, any of the dis-
tinctions between the realm of ideas and that of action. The imminence of the
resultant substantive evil lies in the very essence of the act which produces it
and which is prohibited. Vigorous electioneering by artificial persons with their
vast resources may very easily subvert the exclusive right of the citizens to
participate in a representative government, by "persuasion or coercion of the
individual possessing that right, and by furnishing the means by which the
individual may be persuaded or coerced." 67 The test in such an instance must,
therefore, be reduced to consideration only of the existence of a substantive
evil properly within the scope of the remedial power of Congress. By passing
this legislation, Congress has determined, in effect, that the use of the aggregate
wealth of corporations by persons in control thereof, for political purposes
which may easily amount to economic coercion to the kind of speech contemplated by the
constitutional guarantee." Schwartz, The Supreme Court 251 (1957). Consequently, in
answer to the argument that "legislative intervention can find .. . justification only by
dealing with the abuse and. the rights themselves must not be curtailed," De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937), it seems perfectly dear that since the expenditure
itself to achieve a result which the owner of the money expended does not seek is the
abuse involved, the fact that it is a sine qua non in the exercise of the right should not
prevail. An apparent difficulty in the analogy arises from the fact that picketing is not
the sole manner of exercising labor's right to speak in a trade dispute, whereas the ban on
expenditures and contributions leaves no alternative method where politics are concerned.
Thus, though it may be perfectly reasonable to restrain picketing in particular instances,
there then remaining other media of expression, it may be unreasonable to effect a total
restraint on political speech at election time by leaving no alternate media. On the other
hand, if the purpose of corporations and unions is not limited to electioneering, but
be more broadly considered as an intention to influence subsequent legislation, then
electioneering is but one manner of achieving that result, and, like picketing in a trade
dispute, when restricted, is done so reasonably and not without recourse to other forms of
communication at other times.
64. 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947). "We have said that Congress may regulate the political
conduct of government employees 'within reasonable limits,' even though the regulation
trenches to some extent upon unfettered political action. The determination of the extent
to which political activities of governmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily
with Congress. Courts will interfere only when such regulation passes beyond the gen-
erally existing conception of governmental power."
65. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
66. The district court in United States v. CIO, 77 F. Supp. 355 (1948) applied that
test, however, and found the statute lacking.
67. United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163, 168 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
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which may not accord with the views of those who contributed to that wealth,
is a substantive evil constituting a clear and present danger to both free
federal elections and the continuance of a truly representative government.
Officially, the Supreme Court has never taken a position on the validity of
the abridgment effected by section 610. It has affirmed and reversed lower court
decisions, but only on the question of whether or not an offense was stated in
the indictment. Thus, the Supreme Court in the CIO case 68 affirmed the dis-
missal of an indictment which had been based upon a determination that the
statute was unconstitutional. However, the sole ground of the affirmance was
that a publication in a union newspaper which was distributed to members and a
few other persons should be excepted from the statute. The Court indicated
that to do otherwise would render the constitutionality of the statute "ex-
ceedingly doubtful." The Second Circuit followed by reversing a conviction
based upon the expenditure of a small sum for newspaper advertising and a
radio broadcast, because the court found it impossible to distinguish, on those
facts, the earlier rule of the Supreme Court in the CIO case. 69 Then a district
court found that the proscribed "expenditures" would not include certain sums
paid by a union to its employees for election activity.70 The continued ex-
pansion of the exception was halted, however, when in 1957 the Supreme Court
reversed another district court's dismissal of an indictment for failure to state
an offense, 71 finding that union sponsorship of a televised broadcast endorsing
an election candidate was a patent violation of the act.72
The constitutional issues, however, "unenlightened by the considerations of
a single judge," 73 were consistently avoided by the majority of the Court. Some
members of the Court have, in accord with a philosophy giving first amendment
rights a preferred position, clearly voiced their sentiments, and forecast that
in any subsequent case in which the issue must be decided, their vote will deny
constitutionality. One observer notes that even the government apparently
considers very real the possibility that the statute will be invalidated, and, as
a result, hesitates to prosecute indiscriminately, thus indicating its "willing-
ness to have the statute on the books as a caution.174
Whether this should be so is open to doubt. A proper balance between the
evil and the restraint involved in its remedy appears to have been struck.
Congress has recognized a substantive evil and taken steps to cope with it.
Although it is possible that the Supreme Court will endorse this restriction of
the first amendment, not all the problems which section 610 raises will be
settled thereby. Yet to be considered is the clarity of the terms of the statute.
Does it clearly state the offense which it proscribes? If it does not, in spite of
its reasonableness under the first amendment the statute will fail under the
fifth and sixth amendments.
68. 77 F. Supp. 355, aff'd, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
69. United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1949).
70. United States v. Construction Union, 101 F. Supp. 869, 876 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
71. United States v. International Union, UAW-CIO, 138 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
72. United States v. International Union, UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
73. Id. at 591.
74. 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 61, 66 (1958).
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THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS
At issue here is the clarity of the injunction against making "a contribution
or expenditure in connection with any [federal] election" 75 Although both "con-
tribution" and "expenditure" are defined by the statute,76 their specific mean-
ing in a given case will depend upon the interpretation given the phrase "in
connection with any [federal] election," the elements of which are not defined.
When is a contribution or expenditure made in connection with an election?
Unless a reasonably intelligent man be capable of answering that question
satisfactorily, section 610 must fail, since the terms of a penal statute must
be sufficiently clear and explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.7 7 Otherwise, a
statute which forbids or requires the doing of a certain act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differently
understand its application, violates a basic postulate of due process, 78 and
contravenes the personal guarantees of both the fifth79 and sixth 0 amendments.
In determining the clarity or vagueness of a particular statute, resort to judicial
precedent is often of doubtful value, since in each case, a choice of word or
phrase is almost certain to be a novel employment thereof, or at least involve
novel circumstances. 81 Previous decisions do indicate, however, that the Court
will uphold statutes using "words or phrases having a technical or other special
meaning, well enough known to enable those within their reach to correctly
apply them .. . or a well-settled common law meaning, notwithstanding an
element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ."82
More broadly, however, statutes have been held valid when for reasons found
to result either from the text of the statutes involved, or the subjects with
which they dealt, a standard of some sort was afforded.8 3 Thus, a statute pro-
hibiting congressmen from being "concerned in soliciting ... for any political
purposes whatever" employed language "perfectly intelligible. '8 4 So also, a
statute which barred holding companies from making any contribution "in con-
nection with ... the federal election... of any person" was held constitutional,
the court failing even to consider the sufficiency of the phrase "in connection
with."8 5 To be considered in relation to the clarity of both the conjunctive "in
connection with" and the larger phrase, "in connection with any [federal]
75. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1952).
77. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925).
78. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914).
79. "No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. Const. amend. V.
80. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. .to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation.... ." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
81. Rottschaefer, op. cit. supra note 45, at 766 (1939).
82. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (emphasis added).
83. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 108 (1909).
84. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
85. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943).
1958-59] COMMENTS
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
election," is the decision of the Supreme Court in Gorin v. United States.86
There the petitioner challenged the validity of a federal statute which made it
a crime to transfer to a foreign nation any document or other thing "connected
with" or "relating to" national defense. The Court, apparently not at all con-
cerned with, or disturbed by the phrase "connected with," considered only
that "the use of the words 'national defense' had . ..given them .. .a well
understood connotation, ' '87 and acceded to the government's claim that "na-
tional defense .. . is a generic concept of broad connotation referring to the
military and naval establishments and the related activities of national pre-
paredness.18 8 Under such a view the language of section 610 proscribing con-
tributions and expenditures in connection with a federal election should be
upheld as was the statute in the Gorin case. Surely the concept of a "federal
election" is no broader than that of "national defense"-it would appear, in
fact, to be less vague. An interpretation of "in connection with any [federal]
election" as common, active electioneering,89 therefore, being no less specific
or informative than that accepted by the Court for "national defense," is both
reasonable and valid.90
The fact that the burden is on the entity to realize when its activity borders
more closely upon electioneering than on stating a candidate's record is no
argument against the clarity of the statute. "The law is full of instances where
a man's fate depends upon his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury sub-
sequently estimates it, some matter of degree." 91 One might even say, after
86. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
87. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
88. Ibid.
89. In United States v. International Union, UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 592 (1957), the
majority noted that a distinction must be drawn between "active electioneering" and
merely "stating the record" of a candidate, implying thereby that the proscription of § 610
extends only to "active electioneering."
90. Considering § 610 in relation to its place in the statutory scheme and its purpose
as revealed by its legislative history, "expenditure in connection with an election" can
have only one meaning: expenditure of assets influencing the result of an election. That
such is the proper interpretation becomes perfectly clear when the section is read in rela-
tion to other provisions of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. Thus, § 306 of the 1925
Act (43 Stat. 1072) requires a statement by every person other than a political committee
who makes an expenditure "for the purpose of influencing in two or more states the election
of candidates"; § 307 (43 Stat. 1072) requires a statement by a candidate of expenditures
made by him or with his knowledge and consent "in aid or support of his candidacy for
election, or for the purpose of influencing the result of the election." "In connection with"
and election was apparently kept in § 313 of the same act because this section was taken
over directly from the 1907 Act. It obviously was intended, however, to serve the same
purpose as the more artistic phraseology in the sections quoted above. The conclusion rea-
sonably follows that the prohibition against expenditures "in connection with" an election
must mean affecting or influencing the result of elections-to work such influence is, in
short, to actively electioneer.
91. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913). See also International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223 (1914): "A criminal law is not unconstitutional merely
because it throws upon men the risk of rightly estimating a matter of degree ... Y
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the fact, that in those cases in which the Court has already ruled that the
indictment failed to state an offense, the defendants had rightly estimated the
degree; and because the degree of the connection between their expenditures
and the elections involved was slight, their activities were not included within
the ban.9
2
In United States v. Petrillo,93 the Court clearly ruled that although many
factors must be considered in determining the relevant meaning of the chal-
lenged phrase in a penal statute, such a necessity is not, by itself, sufficient
grounds to strike down the statute. The Court reasoned that
the same thing may be said about most questions which must be submitted to a fact
finding tribunal in order to enforce statutes . . . [and further] the Constitution pre-
sents no such insuperable obstacle to legislation. We think that the language Congress
used need only provide an adequate warning as to what conduct falls under its ban,
and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer
the law in accordance with the will of Congress. 94
In. the same vein, the Court recognized in CIO that expenditure in connection
with an election as used in section 610 is not a term of art, and in spite of the
statutory definition of "expenditure" it has no definitely defined meaning.
Because "the obligation rests also upon this Court in construing congressional
enactments to take care to interpret them so as to avoid a danger of uncon-
stitutionality, 9a5 where the Court is presented with a fact situation which it
can determine to have been included or excluded from the scope and operation
of a statute, it should go no further than making such determination. 6 Then,
by a process either of attrition or addition, the disputed word or phrase will
become more specific, and, consequently, closer to recognition as a term of art
with a special meaning commonly known. Then, too, "matter now buried under
abstract constitutional issues may, by the elucidation of a trial, be brought to
the surface, and in the outcome constitutional questions may disappear."
97
In considering the effect which the ban on expenditures was likely to have,
the members of Congress posed many questions involving borderline cases
under the statute.9 8 The Court, however, is in apparent sympathy with the
92. However, whether there should exist under the statutes a distinction of degree
between large and small expenditures when all contributions, large or small, are banned is
doubtful. "The fact that a contribution may be trivial is not enough to remove the con-
tributor from the scope of federal regulation when the sum of all such contributions may
be far from trivial." Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 367, 374 (8th Cir. 1943).
93. 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
94. Id. at 6.
95. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1948).
96. The same position was taken by justice Holmes in United States v. Wurzbach, 280
U.S. 396, 399 (1930) in considering the vagueness objection to the "persons" covered by
the statute: "There is no doubt that the words include representatives, and if there is any
difficulty, which we are far from intimating, it will be time enough to consider it when
raised by someone whom it concerns.... We imagine that no one not in search of trouble
would feel any."
97. United States v. International Union, UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 592 (1957).
98. 93 Cong. Rec. 6439-40 (1947).
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position taken during the hearings by Senator Taft. The Senator admitted
that he could not "answer various hypotheses without knowing all the cir-
cumstances." 9 The Court, aware of the impossibility of absolute exactitude
in this and similar statutes, noted that "because there may be marginal cases
in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular
fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous
to define a criminal offense."' 00
It may not always be possible to fix with absolute certainty the moment
when a person can be said to be a candidate for office; it may not always be
possible to say beforehand whether a particular activity can be deemed to
have been undertaken for the purpose of influencing a particular election. But
no one who has lived through an election campaign in this country can fail to
know the difference between general discussion of political issues which may
have a remote effect on an election, and the type of activity commonly known
as electioneering. No corporation or unit of organized labor, spending money
actively to electioneer for the success of a particular candidate, can have any
doubt that its activity in such respects contravenes the express prohibition of
the statute. The language of section 610, it is maintained, "conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices. The Constitution requires no more."'' 1
CONCLUSION
Section 610 represents a gradual evolution of congressional policy to control
the power represented by the wealth of legal entities, by enforcing political
neutrality on their part in federal elections. Congress most assuredly has the
power to preserve the purity of federal elections, and the statute here involved
is merely one aspect of the congressional exercise of that power. Legal entities,
it is submitted, have standing under the Constitution to challenge the consti-
tutionality of that particular exercise of the power. However, the enactment
of this legislation represents a deliberate and reasonable legislative judgment
that the danger to free elections arising from the abuse of large accumulations
of capital is sufficiently great to warrant and justify the incidental impairment
of freedom which might result therefrom. The abuse which section 610 was
designed to remedy constituted a substantive evil in the very existence of
which lies a clear and present danger to free elections and representative gov-
ernment. Finally, the language of section 610 appears perfectly intelligible
both from the definitions given in the statute itself, and from the ordinary
usage of language. While some members of the Court have expressed grave
doubts as to constitutionality, it is questionable whether such doubts are wholly
justified. If Congress has reasonably exercised one of its powers, it should not
matter that the particular form which that exercise takes is not, in the view
of the Court, the most desirable.
99. 93 Cong. Rec. 6440 (1947).
100. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
101. Id. at 8.
